Scotland and the Common Agricultural Policy : 1984 and beyond by Scanlan, Simon
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Scanlan, Simon (1984) Scotland and the Common Agricultural Policy : 
1984 and beyond. Quarterly Economic Commentary, 9 (4). pp. 61-63. 
ISSN 0306-7866 , 
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/51615/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
Economic Perspective 
SCOTLAND AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY: 1 9 8 4 AND BEYOND 
Simon Scanlan 
East of Scotland College of Agriculture 
Scott ish farming depends on EEC support. 
This perspective considers the impact of 
the 1984 EEC price package on Scotland and 
speculates about the future of the Common 
Agricultural Policy. 
The 1984 EEC Price Review 
The EEC intervention price for barley has 
been i n c r e a s e d by t h e f o l l o w i n g 
percentages in the 1980s: +4.5 in 1980, 
+6 in 1981, !8.5 in 1982, +3 in 1983. In 
1984 i t was cut by 1$. The pattern i s 
s i m i l a r for t h e o t h e r major CAP 
commodities. After years of regular 
increases in insti tutional support prices, 
there have f ina l ly been price cuts of 1? 
for ce rea l s , beef, sheep, pigs, peas and 
beans, of 2% for oilseed rape, and of over 
3% for bread wheat. The 1984 EEC Price 
Review was different. 
Admittedly, i t would be unwise to be 
misled by the fac t tha t many prices were 
reduced in terms of European Currency 
Uni ts (ECUs). The p r i c e c u t s were 
accompanied by a subtle reorganisation of 
the system of "green exchange rates" used 
to convert the common ECU prices into 
national currencies. The reorganisation 
allowed substantial green devaluations in 
countries such as France, thereby giving 
their farmers a price increase in terms of 
francs, and allowed the UK to avoid any 
r e v a l u a t i o n of the green pound, so 
avoiding further price cuts in terms of 
s t e r l i n g . In t h i s r e s p e c t , and in 
others, the Price Review did not go as far 
as the proposals made to the Council of 
Ministers by the European Commission. 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e p r i c e c u t s and 
associated measures in the 1984 package 
represent the most serious attempt so far 
to solve the problems of agr icu l tu ra l 
surpluses and CAP costs. 
The farmers most a f fec ted by t h i s 
development, in Scotland as elsewhere, are 
those producing milk. The EEC produces 
20% more milk than i t consumes. Support 
for milk pr ices , pr incipal ly through the 
storage and disposal of "mountains" of 
butter and skim milk power, i s budgeted to 
take 30% of CAP guarantee spending in 
1984. For many years now, the dairy 
industry has been seen as the v i l l a i n of 
the piece and after various ineffectual 
past measures the Council has f ina l ly 
decided to do something fundamental. 
The method chosen to tackle the milk 
s u r p l u s c o n s i s t s of q u o t a s , w i t h 
product ion in excess of quota t o be 
p e n a l i s e d by t h e i m p o s i t i o n of a 
subs tant ia l levy. Under the par t icu la r 
system which will operate in the UK, i t i s 
impossible to say in advance how large the 
levy on an individual producer wi l l be -
but i t w i l l make excess output almost 
worthless. Dairy farmers have been 
n o t i f i e d by t h e i r Milk Board of the 
provisional level of t he i r quota for 
1984/85, generally the i r 1983 production 
less 9%. There will be a large number of 
"special cases", who will be given a more 
generous quota, eg farmers who had been 
expanding their dairy enterprise with the 
aid of official grants! 
Milk quotas w i l l cer ta in ly have a very 
damaging effect on the incomes of dairy 
farmers in Scotland. Some wi l l be able 
to improve efficiency and offset the worst 
impact, but there wil l be severe problems 
for those whose land i s not well suited to 
other prof i table enterpr ises (eg in the 
major d a i r y i n g a r ea s of South West 
S c o t l a n d ) . The d i f f i c u l t i e s a r e 
compounded by t h e c o n f u s i o n and 
uncertainty in Brussels, Whitehall and the 
Milk Boards about the d e t a i l s of quota 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The blame for t h i s 
situation l i es mainly with the Council of 
Ministers, who persistently failed to make 
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any long-term decisions about the milk 
surplus until a cr i s i s was reached. 
No other sector of Scottih agriculture has 
had such a harsh Price Review. In the 
case of beef , which makes up over a 
quarter of to t a l output from Scottish 
farms, the special scheme of variable 
premia (deficiency payments) has been 
retained. However the scheme has been 
res t r i c ted and support prices reduced. 
The beef market i s also likely to be upset 
in the coming year by extra cow beef, as 
da i ry farmers reduce t h e i r herds in 
r e s p o n s e to mi lk q u o t a s . Some 
compensation for beef producers will come 
from the UK Government's decision to 
double the subsidy paid on suckler cows 
( i e t h o s e kept s o l e l y for beef 
production, not for producing milk for 
sa le ) . Over 60? of Scottish cows are in 
t h i s category, compared with only 30% of 
a l l UK cows and less than 20% of EEC cows. 
Sheep, accounting for over 10% of Scottish 
farm output, emerged relatively unscathed 
from a review of the CAP Sheepmeat Regime. 
The Regime has been criticised in Brussels 
because of the large subsidies which i t 
pays in the UK. However i t takes only 2% 
of total agricultural support spending and 
the EEC has no surplus of lamb. One 
change in the Regime which wil l affect 
some Scottish producers i s a change in the 
seasonal sca le of guaranteed p r i c e s . 
Returns on lambs sold in July and August 
will be considerably reduced. 
The Budget Crisis 
Farmers throughout the EEC are unhappy 
with the new price package. Nevertheless, 
i t i s not suff icient ly harsh to avoid 
exceeding the presen t l i m i t s of EEC 
revenue. Funds for 1984 are likely to be 
exhausted by l a t e summer and the 
Commission i s seeking advances from the 
ten member countries to finance the CAP in 
particular. No such advances can be made 
without the agreement of a l l ten, and i t 
appears tha t the UK wi l l not agree un t i l 
there i s a sett lement of the "Brit ish 
problem". That requires a long-term 
arrangement to l i m i t the UK's net 
contribution to Brussels. Once such an 
arrangement i s reached (and i t seems very 
close) the UK may be prepared to agree to 
raise the future ceiling of EEC spending. 
In the absence of agreement by Ministers, 
the European Commission i t s e l f has 
extensive powers to reduce costs and to 
keep the EEC solvent. Some such powers 
have already been employed in delaying 
payment of c e r t a i n s u b s i d i e s and in 
r e s t r i c t i ng the extent of intervention. 
These adminis trat ive measures can have 
larger effects on agr icul tura l markets 
than do the policy decisions of Ministers 
themselves . E a r l i e r t h i s year the 
Commission extended the delay in payment 
to merchants for gra in sold to the 
i n t e r v e n t i o n a u t h o r i t i e s and t h u s 
e f f e c t i v e l y reduced the intervention 
support price by £4 per tonne. 
The budgetary problems of the EEC are 
thus, by default, giving substantial power 
to the "civi l service" in Brussels to 
alter the CAP. As a strategy for reform, 
t h i s method could be most inappropriate, 
undemocratic and haphazard. However, i t 
does have the mer i t of avoiding the 
po l i t i ca l obstacles and publici ty which 
sometimes prevent difficult decisions in 
the Council of Ministers. 
Longer Ter« Prospects for the CAP 
I t i s most unlikely that EEC governments 
wi l l allow the CAP to collapse. I t may 
not be a very good policy, but i t i s the 
only policy they have. One poss ib i l i ty 
for the future i s that more agr icu l tura l 
spending wi l l be carried out di rect ly by 
governments, with less cost falling on the 
EEC budget. A greater share of EEC money 
i s l i k e l y to go on n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l 
pol ic ies . Within agriculture the balance 
of support i s l ike ly to switch away from 
Scotland towards Mediterranean products 
following the entry of Spain and Portugal. 
The principle of quotas, introduced t h i s 
year for milk, and already exis t ing for 
sugar i s unlikely to be extended to other 
commodities. Apart from the administra-
t i v e problems, the need for quotas 
elsewhere is not so great. In the case of 
milk, a major aim of EEC policy has been 
to protect small producers and so price 
cuts were not seen to apply. 
An a g r i c u l t u r a l commodity becomes a 
problem in the EEC if i t i s seriously in 
surplus. A surplus can be very costly for 
the EEC budget and i t s disposal on world 
markets can antagonise other t r ad i t iona l 
suppl iers . On both points , the next 
largest problem after milk i s in cereals, 
and a Commission official recently warned 
that support pr ices for grain wi l l soon 
have to be r e s t r i c t e d . Third on the "hit 
l i s t " i s probably beef. 
The containment of agricultural output, by 
whatever means, i m p l i e s t h a t fu tu re 
improvements in efficiency will result in 
the re lease of resources to some other 
ac t iv i ty . There i s l i t t l e point in milk 
quo tas , for example, i f they simply 
t ransfer resources to the production of 
greater surpluses of cereals . Scot t ish 
farmers w i l l t h e r e f o r e want to know 
whether there i s any commodity which can 
can produce which will not soon be subject 
to prices squeezes or quotas or other 
r e s t r i c t i o n s . One answer i s vegetable 
proteins . The EEC i s far below self-
sufficiency in protein for animal feed and 
The organisat ion and finances of the 
National Coal Board as depicted in the 
r e c e n t r e p o r t of the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission* makes devastating 
reading. The unemotional tone of the 
report lays bare a tale of mismanagement 
and incompetence on a sca le , which if 
repl icated in the Soviet Union, would 
perhaps have earned the senior executives 
r e s p o n s i b l e severe punishment. The 
comparison wi th the Sovie t Union i s 
suggested by the fact tha t the industry 
has apparently been run since nationalisa-
tion in 1947 like an industry in a planned 
economy, i.e with physical performance 
rather than financial indicators. There 
has been a consequent maldis t r ibut ion of 
inves tment and devastat ion of worker 
gives enormous support to oi lseed rape, 
peas, beans and now lupins. There have 
been some warnings about the cost of these 
commodities to the EEC budget and there i s 
already a "guarantee threshold" which 
leads to a trimming of rapeseed prices if 
output grows too quickly. However, t h i s 
is "not to stop production, but to allow a 
prudent growth".* In the very long term, 
the Commission i s also looking a t the 
scope for expanding timber production and 
at various new biological energy sources. 
In the meantime, the general trend i s 
l ikely to be towards reduced support for 
most major commodities, coupled with 
special aid for those farmers l e a s t able 
to cope. This could mean increased 
assistance to "less favoured areas" which 
include much of Scotland. 
* Claude Vi l la in , Director General for 
Agriculture, European Commission, February 
1984 
morale. There have, however, been no 
comparable sanctions on management. 
As a consequence of the way in which the 
industry has been run, i t has become a 
huge drain on the resources of the rest of 
society. All the following figures refer 
to 1981/82, the la tes t year for which data 
were available for the purposes of the MMC 
enquiry. In the same year, grant aid 
receivable from the government amounted to 
no less than £575 mil l ion, while the 
figures for the two previous years were 
£254 m i l l i o n and £251 m i l l i o n 
respectively. In addition, in that year 
the NCB borrowed £902 mil l ion from the 
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